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215

## Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but not Practised

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# Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but not Practised

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## Abstract

We provide evidence for the status quo in economics with respect to data sharing using a unique data set with 488 hand-collected observations randomly taken from researchers' academic webpages. Out of the sample, 435 researchers (89.14%) neither have a data&code section nor indicate whether and where their data is available. We find that 8.81% of researchers share some of their data whereas only 2.05% fully share. We run an ordered probit regression to relate the decision of researchers to share to their observable characteristics. We find that three predictors are positive and significant across specifications: being full professor, working at a higher-ranked institution and personal attitudes towards sharing as indicated by sharing other material such as lecture slides.

*Keywords:* Data sharing, data availability, open science

*JEL classification:* B40, C80, L59

## 1 Introduction

Hamermesh (2006, p. 715) suggests that “economists treat replication ... as an ideal to be professed but not to be practised”. We study the availability of data that permits other researchers and the general public to identify errors, reject or refine theories and reuse the data for subsequent research. This openness to scrutiny and challenge fosters the ability of self-correction in science.<sup>1</sup> Most researchers seem to embrace the idea of self-correction and

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<sup>1</sup>The benefits of releasing data are not confined to replication of results or new research. They may also have strong legal implications as, for example, helping to reduce corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) or detect collusion (Christie and Schultz, 1994).

replicability in science associated with data sharing. In practice, however, those advantages often fail to outweigh researchers' costs to create data and the "supply of' replicable results in economics has been minimal" according to Anderson et al. (2008, p. 99). The aims of this paper are twofold. First, we use a unique hand-collected data set of 488 empirical economists from the top 100 economics departments and top 50 business schools to provide evidence for the status quo of data sharing in economics. Second, we use an ordered probit model to relate observable characteristics of researchers to their decision of whether or not to share their data.

While most of the top-ranked economics journals have recently introduced a data availability policy,<sup>2</sup> the vast majority of journals either do not have a policy that requires authors to share their data or are reluctant to enforce it (McCullough, 2009; McCullough and Vinod, 2003). Also, Anderson et al. (2008) suggest that authors generally hesitate to share their data and code despite their pre-publication commitment to provide this information. This may suggest that editors, referees and readers are confident that the empirical results presented in the papers are always credible and robust. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Dewald et al. (1986) tried to replicate 54 papers published in the *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* and could only replicate two. Later, McCullough et al. (2006) tried to replicate 69 articles with archived data entries published in the same journal and could only replicate 14. Also, McCullough et al. (2008) tried to replicate 117 articles with archived entries published in the *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* and could only replicate 9. These findings raise concerns regarding the credibility and reliability of empirical work.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper we provide evidence that data sharing in economics is still scarce and that, even though the ease of sharing has increased<sup>4</sup> and many top-ranked journals require sharing,

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<sup>2</sup>For instance, the *American Economic Journals*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Journal of Political Economy*, and *Econometrica*.

<sup>3</sup>This phenomenon is not limited to economics. In medicine, for example, replication of published pre-clinical studies often fails (Begley and Ellis, 2012) and most authors fail to fully adhere to data availability policies of high-impact journals (Alsheikh-Ali et al., 2011).

<sup>4</sup>Data repositories as, for instance, the US\$200,000 repository at the University of Rochester make it easy for researchers to share their data. However, they lie mostly empty (Nelson, 2009).

researchers publish neither data nor codes on their webpages. We further investigate whether there is a link between observable researchers' characteristics and their decision to share. We believe that our analysis is a first step to understand the incentives to share data and the relation between data sharing and observable characteristics of researchers.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3, we run the regressions and present the results. Section 4 concludes our study.

## 2 Data

In this section we evaluate the hand-collected data on the sharing behaviour of empirical researchers. In addition to an overview of the status quo of data sharing in economics, we relate the researchers' observable characteristics to their decision of whether or not to share their data. In the regression model, we distinguish between structural characteristics, e.g. status, research experience or gender, and individual preferences towards sharing as proxied by sharing material other than data, e.g. lecture slides.

The data set we use consists of 488 observations that were collected from researchers' webpages in the time period from March 2012 to July 2012. In the data set we gathered information on the willingness to share data of 388 economists affiliated with an economics department and 100 affiliated with a business school. The researchers were chosen uniformly across the top 100 economics departments (four observations each) and top 50 business schools (two observations each) and randomly within the respective institution.<sup>5</sup> Economics departments were chosen using the Shanghai Ranking 2011 in Economics and Business<sup>6</sup> and business schools were chosen using the Financial Times Global MBA Ranking 2011.<sup>7</sup> We also collected information on the position, research grants, gender, years since Ph.D. and age of researchers from their CVs, and whether researchers share other material from their

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<sup>5</sup>Three business schools (London Business School, INSEAD and HEC Paris) were listed in both rankings. Thus, we excluded 12 observations from the top 100 economics departments in our data set.

<sup>6</sup>See <http://www.shanghairanking.com/SubjectEcoBus2011.html> (last accessed February 21, 2013).

<sup>7</sup>See <http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/global-mba-rankings-2011> (last accessed February 21, 2013).

academic webpages. We only collected information on researchers doing mostly empirical work. The sample was constructed to be representative for authors who frequently publish and not for the entire community of researchers. Thus, highly-ranked institutions and more productive researchers are considered more frequently. The reason for this choice is that only authors who publish might share their data. In addition, the work by these authors is arguably more innovative and has had a larger impact on further research (Card and DellaVigna, 2013). For instance, top economics departments hold a dominant position in the production of economics literature (Coupé, 2003). These factors increase the importance of data availability at the top rather than at the bottom of academic research.

**Table 1** summarizes the data and shows the correlation coefficients with respect to *ShareData*, the dependent variable in our model. *ShareData* is an ordinal variable that represents the extent to which a researcher makes her data available. It can take three values, no sharing (0), some sharing (1), and full sharing (2). The values of sharing are defined as follows: *ShareData* = 1 indicates that a researcher shares her data in an only fragmentary manner. For most papers neither the data nor the code is available. *ShareData* = 2 indicates that the researcher has a well-designed data and code section and shares or provides additional information on the availability of *most* of the data. While this definition might seem to contrast with “full sharing” note that many data sets cannot be made available.<sup>8</sup> *Shareothermat* is a binary variable that indicates whether a researcher shares other material such as lecture slides. In contrast to the other variables, *Shareothermat* reflects a preference rather than a characteristic of the researcher and thus we run the regressions with and without it. *Ranking* is given by the Shanghai Ranking (Financial Times Global MBA Ranking) for economics departments (business schools). The Shanghai Ranking for economics departments between position 51 and 75 (76 and 100) is aggregated. Thus, we take the mean ranking values 63 and 88, respectively. *FullProfessor* is a binary variable indi-

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<sup>8</sup>A common reason is confidentiality agreements with the firm or institution providing the data. Note that this does not per se make replication impossible. Some research institutes allow replication using their computers and in addition there are free to use cloud-data services. For example runmycode.org guarantees costless replication and protects confidential data.

cating whether or not the researcher is a full professor. *BusinessSchool* is a binary variable indicating whether the researcher works in a business school or in an economics department. *Experience* is defined as the years since Ph.D. If the date of birth was not available we estimated *Age* as 2012-“Year of Ph.D.”+30. *NrResearchGrants* indicates the total number of research grants won by the researcher. Finally, *Male*, *USAempl* and *EUempl* are binary variables and equal to 1 if the researcher is male, works in the U.S. or in Europe, respectively.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Obs.	Min	Max	Share Data- Correlation
Share Data	0.129	0	0.392	488	0	2	1
Share other mat.	0.184	0	0.388	488	0	1	0.235***
Ranking	44.97	40.5	28.15	488	1	88	-0.081*
Full Professor	0.529	1	0.500	488	0	1	0.133***
Business School	0.205	0	0.404	488	0	1	-0.011
Experience	17.95	16	12.28	488	0	50	0.039
Age	47.72	46	12.11	488	29	80	0.038
Nr. Research Grants	6.717	5	8.060	488	0	47	0.001
Male	0.801	1	0.399	488	0	1	0.124***
USA empl.	0.678	1	0.468	488	0	1	0.07
EU empl.	0.168	0	0.374	488	0	1	-0.022
Other empl.	.153	0	.361	488	0	1	-0.067

### 3 Empirical Results

The status quo in economics is to not share data: 89.14% of researchers do not share their data. About 8.81% (2.05%) of researchers partly (fully) share their data. A plausible reason for this status quo in data sharing has been brought forward by Moffitt (2007), chief editor of the American Economic Review from 2004 to 2010. He states that:

“Economists call the ‘patent’ problem the problem that those who put the effort into constructing a data set and writing programs (months of work) have the right to use it for further research for X years.”

Intuitively, researchers have little or no incentive to share and are reluctant to create self-induced competition for their own further research.

We use an ordered probit model to estimate the relation between sharing and the set of observable characteristics of researchers presented above. The results are shown in **Table 2**.

**Table 2: Regression Analysis**

Dependent Variable: Regression Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Share Data: Ordinal=0 no sharing; 1 some sharing; 2 full sharing			Ordered probit		
Share other mat.	0.799*** (0.171)	0.801*** (0.171)	0.777*** (0.173)			
Ranking	-0.00660** (0.00300)	-0.00662** (0.00304)	-0.00532* (0.00318)	-0.00614** (0.00289)	-0.00622** (0.00292)	-0.00481 (0.00307)
Full Professor	0.437*** (0.163)	0.607*** (0.212)	0.591*** (0.226)	0.441*** (0.159)	0.603*** (0.206)	0.602*** (0.220)
Business School	-0.120 (0.208)	-0.138 (0.209)	-0.0910 (0.219)	-0.195 (0.200)	-0.215 (0.201)	-0.148 (0.211)
Experience		-0.0101 (0.00883)	-0.0133 (0.00911)		-0.00968 (0.00851)	-0.0137 (0.00880)
Nr. Research Grants		-0.00593 (0.0104)	-0.00681 (0.0107)		-0.00568 (0.00994)	-0.00649 (0.0102)
Male			0.618** (0.287)			0.657** (0.278)
USA empl.			0.408 (0.290)			0.404 (0.275)
EU empl.			0.223 (0.332)			0.150 (0.315)
Constant (cut 1)	1.402*** (0.196)	1.271*** (0.221)	2.124*** (0.434)	1.199*** (0.185)	1.070*** (0.211)	1.945*** (0.417)
Constant (cut 2)	2.305*** (0.234)	2.180*** (0.255)	3.055*** (0.457)	2.038*** (0.216)	1.915*** (0.237)	2.816*** (0.436)
Observations	488	488	488	488	488	488

Note: The dependent variable in all six specifications is *ShareData*, which takes on three values. An increase in *Ranking* represents a decrease in the ranking of the institution. Thus, a negative coefficient stands for more data availability in higher-ranked institutions. All coefficients are estimated using an ordered probit model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the significance levels are reported as follows: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

In specifications (1), (2) and (3), we include the researchers' personal attitude towards sharing as proxied by *Shareothermat*. In specifications (4), (5) and (6), we keep only the structural variables. The results do not change.

Among the structural variables we find two main positive and significant predictors for sharing: *FullProfessor* and *Ranking*. First, researchers at an advanced stage of their career



tend to share more than junior scholars. The coefficient is positive and highly significant at the 1% level throughout all six specifications. Being full professor increases the likelihood of some sharing (full sharing) as compared to no sharing (some sharing) by 7.2% (1.6%). The career concerns of young researchers might play a role in the decision to share data. Data sharing creates competition as it permits other researchers to use a data set before its creator can fully exploit it in further research. As an additional publication is arguably more valuable in terms of career concerns for (untenured) junior scholars than for full professors, it is not surprising that full professors share their data more frequently.<sup>9</sup> An alternative explanation is that full professors have more financial resources to hire research assistants to create and update the data&code section on their webpages. We control for this by adding the number of research grants that can be thought of as a proxy for the amount of financial resources available to the researcher. In both models, with and without researchers' personal attitudes towards sharing, the sign and significance level of *FullProfessor* remain unchanged.

Second, researchers affiliated with higher-ranked institutions tend to share more. To illustrate, being affiliated with an institution ranked 50 positions higher increases the likelihood of some sharing (full sharing) as compared to no sharing (some sharing) by 3.3% (0.7%). Controlling for *USAempl*, the significance of *Ranking* diminishes in specifications (3) and (6) as most of the top-ranked institutions are in the U.S. in the rankings we use in our data set.

The strongest predictor of *ShareData* is *Shareothermat*. The coefficient is positive and highly significant. Sharing other material increases the likelihood of some sharing (full sharing) as compared to no sharing (some sharing) by 12.2% (3.8%). This result suggests that personal attitudes have the largest impact on the likelihood of data sharing. Apart from *Male*,<sup>10</sup> all other variables are insignificant throughout all specifications.

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<sup>9</sup>An intuition for this line of argument is provided by Stanford's tenured Professor Robert Hall (2009). Writing about the career incentives of tenured professors, he states: "Now that you have tenure, the number of papers you produce is amazingly irrelevant."

<sup>10</sup>Three female researchers (out of a total of 97) in our data set (partly) share data. We do not have sufficient data to study gender effects.

## 4 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that the current status quo in economics is to not share data or facilitate access to data and codes used for empirical work. We investigate the relation between sharing and observable researchers' characteristics using an ordered probit regression. We find three statistically significant relations across specifications in our data. The likelihood to share is positively associated with sharing other material, being full professor and being affiliated with a higher-ranked institution.

In a recent article, Angrist and Pischke (2010) argue that better research design and the consequent causal interpretation of the regression coefficients “is taking the con out of econometrics”. Even though the identification strategy is essential for thorough empirical work, without the possibility of replication and extension provided by sharing data and codes, doubts about the credibility of empirical work remain (Hamermesh, 2006; McCullough et al., 2008). On the one hand, the public availability of data may increase the credibility of empirical work and the reputation of authors as their work might be replicated by others. On the other, it may facilitate new research as both data and codes would be readily available (McCullough and Vinod, 2003).

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